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IS IT POSSIBLE TO 
DERIVE A "MORAl!' 
OUCHT FROM 
A STATEMENT OF FACT? 
Antonio T. Piñón 
When men gather to frame laws, or to suggest measures for enact-
ment into law-e.g., acode of medical law to govern the practice of 
medicine-may they proceed with absolute freedom from any prior 
constraints, or are they obligated to proceed with due regard for, and 
obedience to, natural human rights? What is at issue here is whether 
aH law is a matter of convention or there exists a higher and funda-
mental moral law binding on lawgivers themselves. 
The widespread phenomenon of permissiveness, the sustained and 
intensified campaigns for divorce, birth control, abortion, and eutha-
nasia have predictably and inevitably led to the questioning of the 
existence of such a fundamental morallaw. 
David Hume is said to have been the first to record explicitIy the 
basic argument against the existence of a natural moral law in the 
foHowing passage: 
«In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I 
have always remark' d, that the author proceeds for sorne time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am 
surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions 
is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with 
an ought, or an ought noto This change is imperceptible; but is, how-
ever, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses 
sorne new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be 
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observ' d and explaine' d; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation 
can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.» l. 
In short, Iogic says that it is impossible to infer in the conclusion 
more than what is contained in the premises. Therefore, from is-
statements that assert facts it is impossible to derive ought-statements 
that assert moral values or obligations. Since G. E. Moore the fallacy 
Hume claims to underlie every system of morality has been Iabeled 
the naturalistic fallacy. 
1 submit that the naturalistic fallacy, far from being a valid criti-
cism, is itself a gIaring fallacy. I propose to show: (1) That there is no 
IogicaI objection in principIe to deriving ought from is; (2) That it is 
possible, in general, to derive ought-statements from a certain type of 
is-statements; and (3) that a moral ought can be validly derived from 
an is. 
1 
Is there, in principIe, an objection to deriving ought from is? 
Hume says there is. And at first gIance he seems to be correcto To 
show that he is not, the point at issue must be sharply defined, and 
this requires taking stock of the conditions governing the deduction of 
conclusions from premises. 
The conditions are the following: (1) It is impossible to draw out 
in the conclusion more than is contained in the premises. (2) The con-
clusion may not state explicitly what the premises state explicitly. To 
do otherwise is to fall into the fallacy of begging the question. (3) The 
conclusion asserts explicitly what is contained implicitly in the premi-
ses. (4) Nothing that is not implicit in the premises can be deduced as 
a conclusion. 
The naturalistic fallacy seems to violate the first canon of de-
duction. It draws out more than is contained in the premises: it draws 
ought, whereas the premises contain only is. Thus the conclusion as-
serts more than is contained in the premises. However, the true 
meaning of condition (1) appears only when taken in conjunction with 
the other conditions. Condition (2), e.g., says that the explicit content 
of the conclusion may not be the same as the explicit content of the 
premises under pain of begging the question. In other words, the con-
1. Treatise, L. S. Selby-Bigges ed., pg. 569. 
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clusion must state explicitly more than what the premises state expli-
citly. Thus the conclusion interpretation of condition (1) is the follo-
wing: the conclusion may not explicitIy state more than what is impli-
citIy contained in the premises. 
The point at issue, then, is this: It is obvious that ought is not 
explicitly contained in is, but it is not obvious that ought is not con-
tained IMPLICITL y in is. If ought is not contained implicitIy in is, then 
we must grant ought cannot be derived from is. On the other hand, if 
ought is IMPLICIT in is, then there is no logical objection 
to deducing ought from is. 
At this stage Hume and his followers are left with four alterna ti-
ves: (1) Issue a blanket denial to the effect than no is implicitIy con-
tains ought: (2) Establish by examination of particular is-statements 
that no ought is implicit in is; (3) Claim that any is that implicitly 
contains ought, is not a genuine is, but an ought in disguise; (4) Con-
cede that the possibility of deriving ought from is is in principIe an 
open question. 
Hume, of course, cannot accept alternative (4). Neither can he opt 
for alternative (2). The examination of particular is-statements can only 
yield a particular conclusion, not a universal assertion that no is im-
plicitIy contains ought. 
Actually Hume adopts alternative (1). In the aboye quoted passage 
he says that ought or ought not expresses a new affirmation, and it 
seems altogether inconceivable how this new affirmation can be a 
deduction from others that are entirely different from it. 
It must be admitted that ought expresses a new assertion. If new, 
therefore different from the assertions in the premises. So far so good. 
And if Hume had asked to be shown how this new assertion is deduced 
from others that are different from it, he would have been entirely 
within his rights. But Hume did not say «different», what he said was 
«entirely different». That ought is diferent from is is shown by the 
fact that what ought to be sometimes is noto But that ought is not en-
tirely different from is is also shown by the fact that what ought to 
be sorne times is. By gratuitously adding that is is entirely different 
from ought, Hume defines is in a way that excludes ought, and then 
triumphantIy claims that he has shown that ought cannot be deduced 
from is. A plain case of begging the question 2. 
2. «Hume defines 'truth' in such a way as to exclude ethical judgements 
from it, and professes that he has proved that they are so excluded. ... The fea-
618 ANTONIO T. PI~ON 
An instance of alternative (3) is R. N. Hare of Oxford. 
«I am going to give reasons for holding that by no form of inferen-
ce, however loose, can we get an answer to the question 'What shall 1 
do?' out of a set of premises which do not contain, at any rate, implic-
itly, an imperative.. . To hold that an imperative conclusion can be 
derived from purely indicative premises leads to representing matters 
of substance as if they were verbal matters» 3. 
Note the significant admission that indicatives might implicitly 
contain an imperative. Observe, next, how he backtracks from his ad-
mission by talking of «purely indicative premises». How and why has 
that «purely» (so reminiscent of Hume's «entirely») been smuggled in? 
If Hare admits, as he does, that sorne indicatives might implicitly 
contain imperatives, then he is admitting that those indicatives are not 
purely indicatives. Then what can talk of «pure indicatives» mean at 
this juncture save to imply that no statement deserves to be called 
indicative unless it is purely so. Which is tantamount to saying that 
no indicative implicitly containing an imperative is abona fide indica-
tive, but an imperative in disguise. 
Against Hare 1 wish to point out that the premises and the conclu-
sion do not differ in their implicit contento They differ in their expli-
cit contento Hence, premises and conclusions are to be characterized 
by their explicit contento Therefore, when Hare takes account of the 
implicit cantent of the is-premise in order to characterize it by impli-
cation as an imperative in disguise, his claim is a self-serving claim 
and a petitia in disguise, exactly like Hume's. 
It, thus, appears negatively that there is no logical objection to 
tures of Hume's philosophy which 1 have mentioned, like many other features of 
it, would incline me to think that Hume was a mere -brilliant- sophist; and 
his procedures are certainly sophistical. But 1 am forced, not to reverse, but to 
add to, this judgement by a peculiarity of Hume's philosophising : namely that 
although he reaches his conclusions -with which he is in love- by sophistical 
methods, his considerations constantIy open up very deep and important problems. 
It is often the case that in the act of exhibiting the sophistry one finds oneself 
noticing matters which deserve a lot of exploring: the obvious stands in need of 
investigation as a result of the points that Hume pretends to have made .. . . Hen-
ce he is a very profound and great philosopher, in spite of his sophistry». (G. E. M. 
ANSCOMBE, Modern Moral Phi losophy, in The /s / Ought Question, ed Hudson, Mac-
millan, 1969, pgs. 176-177. 
3. The Language 01 Morals, 1, 3.4-3.5, Oxford University Press, 1961, pgs. 
46-47. 
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deriving ought from is, provided that it can be shown that certain is-
statements are such as to contain ought-statements implicitly. 
11 
We are now in a position to take a second step forward. Ought is 
an auxiliary modal verbo 1 ts auxiliary nature appears from the fact 
that it can never be employed alone, but always as an adjunct to 
another principal verbo Its modal meaning appears in contraposition 
to may and might. These two auxiliaries in general express the idea of 
contingency and freedom. Ought (together with should, and must), on 
the other hand, expresses the idea of determination and necessity. 
Thus the question «Is it possible to deduce ought from is?» can be 
restated as follows «Can a statement of necessity be implicit in a sta-
tement of fact?». 
A factual statement is one that describes the state of affairs, the 
way things are and behave. Now, there are two outstanding facts 
about this world. If we take it as true that the only simple physical 
entities are the subatomic particles, then it is plain that in our daily 
lives we never de al with simple entities singly, but with composites 
or wholes arising out of them, with a dog, a cat, a piece of wood, etc. 
Now, a whole is not a mere heap. A whole is an organized, or structu-
red thing. The other out standing fact is that the numberless things 
in this world do not exist in isolation, but act and react with one 
another along regular lines or patterns. It is not only things that are 
wholes, but also processes. The difference between the two lies in the 
fact that in the case of things, the component parts coexist simul-
taneously; in the case of a process, its components are spread out 
in time. But this characteristic only stresses all the more the need for 
a pattern on which the unity and the intelligibility of the whole pro-
ces s dependo 
Factual or is-statements, therefore, are of two kinds: (1) des-
criptions of parts separately; and (2) descriptions of the patterns in 
accordance with which the parts are structured into a whole. The 
second type is as much, if not more, a factual statement as the first 
type. We need only remind ourselves of Hume's criterion for factual 
statements, viz. that we learn of matters of fact in one way, through 
observation or experience. That is exactly the way we come to know the 
pattern or structure, in the absence of which the parts might exist, 
but the whole does not exist. 
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Now, a necessity of sorne kind, of greater or lesser degree. is built-
in in any pattern or structure. In other words, statements of pattern 
or structure are is-statements that implicitly contain ought. The alpha-
bet pattern tells us the factual sequence of the letters; but in telling 
us this, it also tells us the place a given name ought to occupy in a 
list of names. The schematic of a TV set gives us the factual organiza-
tion of the parts, but in pointing out how the parts are related to each 
other, it also tells us, when the set breaks down, the parts that ought 
to be replaced, and the place where they ought to be connected. The 
pattern of the solar system, plus the pattern of Apollo's flight not only 
describe the actual paths of the moon and the space vehicle, but also 
tell us the day, hour, and position at which they ought to intersect. 
Prom the pattern of electrons in the atom, scientists have deduced the 
theory of valences that tells us which elements ought to be capable of 
combining with which other elements. Only after diagnosing the mala-
dy (is, indicative), is the physician able to prescribe (imperative) the 
required (necessary, ought) therapy. 
Implicit, too, in staments of pattern is a rough and rudimentary 
notion of right and wrong. Whatever is positively in accordance with 
the pattern or structure is right. Whatever is positively contrary to 
the pattern is wrong. 
No special philosophical acumen is needed te see that ought, right, 
and wrong, in a general sense are implicit in principIe in factual state-
ments of pattern 4. What it takes is simple, honest common sense avail-
lable even to the humblest unlettered farmer who knows exactly what 
his crops and livestock need, and consequently what he ought to do 
that is right for them, and what the ought to avoid that is wrong 
for them. 
In a nutshell: the pattern and structure of things and processes 
is something we learn through observation and experience, i.e., a 
matter of fact. Statements of pattern or structure, therefore, are is-
statements. But our understanding of the pattern gives us to under-
stand what is necessary, fitting (right) or unbeffitting (wrong). There-
fore, in principIe, ought can be deduced from a certain type of is. 
4. Anyone who has attempted to put together a jig-saw puzzle has expe. 
riential insight into the implicitness of ought in pattern. The first tries are cha-
racterized by hit-and-miss or trial-and-error procedures. In the absence of any re-
cognizable pattern the efforts are purely random. It is only when the pattern be-
gins to emerge that one can institute a systematic hunt for the missing pieces. The 
recognition of pattern enables the problem solver to tell what ought to be where. 
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III 
Up to this point the moral ought has not entered into the picture. 
To see how it enters we must make a fresh start by looking into the 
notion of the good. What is meant by the good? This is a question that 
has bedevilled philosophers of the analytic tradition, who make a 
fetish of seeking accurate and precise definitions-which is altogether 
valid, up to a point. But they met their nemesis in thegood. G. E. 
Moore figuratively threw up his hands in desperation and said. 
«If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, 
and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'how is good to be 
defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have 
to say about it» 5. 
Moore gave the correct answer, but for the wrong reason. Good 
is indeed undefinable because it is a transcendental termo Good is one 
of those terms that can be predicated of any and all things howsoever 
they may differ among themselves: good man, good thief, good horse, 
good cactus, good shoes, etc. Transcendental terms are analogical 
terms. Sorne terms are employed in only one and the same meaning, 
e.g., mamma!. They are called univocal. Other terms are employed in 
totally different meanings, as when I say «I need a pen to write» and 
«Bring the sheep to the pen». These are called equivoca!. Sorne other 
terms have neither one and the same, nor totally different meanings, 
but a meaning that is at once similarly dissimilar; e.g., sharp cry, 
sharp knife, sharp wine, sharp word. These are called analogical or 
analogous. Univocal terms have one definition. Equivocal terms have 
many definitions. But analogical terms have no definition; they are 
strictly undefinable. It is impossible, e.g., to give a definition of sharp 
that will include cry, knife, wine, and word. 
The problem, then, is not how to define good. It is undefinable. 
The problem is how is good intelligible. Just as it is impossible to 
define whole and parts separately, but they are made intelligible by 
relating them to each other, so the good is made intelligible by refer-
ring it to desire, and vice versa. The good is that which fulfills or 
satisfies, or quiets desire. And desire is that wich aims at, or seeks, or 
tends to the good This relationship between good and desire is usually 
shortened to one single word: desirable. But that one word has itself 
5. Principia Ethica, chapo I, n. 6; Cambridge University Press, 1968, pg. 6. 
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spawned ambiguities and given rise to two radically different schools 
of ethics, which, surprisingly, come round eventually to the same 
resulto 
Desirable can mean either: (1) What can be desired; (2) what 
de serves to be desired or is worthy of desire. J. S. Mill took the first 
meaning and argued: desirable is like visible. Now the only proof that 
a thing is visible is that sorne one actually sees it or actually has seen 
it. So the only proof that any thing is desirable is that it has been or 
is actually desired by somebody. This is the fundamental tenet of the 
empirical or positivistic or naturalistic school of ethics. It inevitably 
leads to moral relativismo G. E. Moore argued against Mill as follows: 
desirable is more like admirable than like visible. Now, admirable 
properly does not mean can be admired, but rather worthy of admira-
tion, whether anyone admires it or not. Hence good means worthy of 
being desired, independently of whether anyone desires it or not. Whe-
reas the positivistic school reduces ethics to matters-of-fact, this other 
school called antinaturalist and sometimes intuitionist, completely 
divorces ethics from empirical facts. 
The truth here, as in many other cases, Hes not in the either-or, 
but in the full acceptance that desirable is both what can be desired 
and what is worthy of desire. But he re we come up against another 
difficulty. If we accept both meanings at once, then it should logically 
follow that whatever can be or is desired is at the same time worthy 
of being desired, which is patently falseo For there are things that can 
be and are actually desired which are not worthy of desire, or ought 
not to be desired. Stealing, narcotics are desirable in the first sense, 
they can be and are actually desired by many people. But they ought 
not to be desired, and thus they are punishable crimes. Or as G. E. 
Moore argues: of anything that is actually desired, one can always ask 
the question: Is this thing really good? Or as Spinoza puts the 
question: is a thing good because 1 desire it, or do 1 desire it because 
it is good? 
The question is unanswerable and a source of riddiles to contem-
porary philosophers because they always un de stand «desire» in only 
one univocal sense. They mean by desire the felt or conscious want or 
need of something, the seeking or the tendency to something as the 
result of an experience. The key factor in this description is «felt» or 
«conscious» or «the result of an experience». Earlier philosophers un-
derstood that desire could be validly taken in a deeper analogical sense. 
Want and tendency may not be conscious without being one with the 
less real. One, e.g. may need something without even being aware of 
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it, without even desiring it, but the unawareness or the absence of 
actual desire does not make the need less real. Thus psychologists and 
psychiatrists talk of needs that are built-in in the psyche itself at the-
subconscious or even unconscious leve!. Further down, way below the 
psyche there are needs built-in the biological organism as such, needs 
that even take the form of actual movement or search. We are all 
aware of the fact that roots strain towards water, and leaves towards 
sunlight. And even below the level of organisms there is the funda-
mental tendency in all things towards the preservation of their own 
existence. 1 need not cite here how tenaciously life adapts itself and 
clings to the harshest and most adverse conditions of soil and climate. 
1 need but cite the all-pervading fact that it takes energy to destroy 
anything, and that can only mean that everything resists its destruc-
tion. 
Desire, then, can be undestood genuinely albeit analogously on 
two different levels: (1) on the psychological level of felt need or 
conscious desire, and (2) on the ontallevel of inherent, built-in, natu-
ral needs or capacities or tendencies. The analogy of desire was cur-
rent tender among eadier philosophers. This fundamental insight is 
not disproved but corroborated by modern findings. It is most unfor-
tunate that modern philosophers seem abysmally ignorant of it. 
The analogy of desire entails correspondingly the analogy of the 
good. The good can now plainly be seen to cover two types of good: 
(1) the good which felt need or conscious desire seeks as its fulfill-
ment; and (2) the good which natural need or tendency seeks as its 
fulfillment. How do we characterize these two types? 
We consciously desire or seek something if-and only if-we 
deem it good. The necessary and sufficient condition is that it appear 
good to uso Thus, the good correlated to felt need for conscious desire 
is the aparent good. On the other hand, natural need or capacity tends 
to that which does in fact really satisfy or fill it up. Lungs need oxygen. 
y ou can physically fill them up with any other thing, but the need will 
not be satisfied. Hence, on the ontallevel of natural need or capacity, 
nothing will do except the real good. 
We are now in a position to solve Spinoza's puzzle. Is a thing good 
because we desire it, or do we desire it because it is good? To say 
that a thing is good because we desire it is true on the level of 
conscious desire and apparent good. Anything can be called good, at 
least apparently, simply because someone wants or desires it. Simi-
lady to say that we desire a thing because it is good is true on the 
level of natural needj capacity and real good. Natural needs and ca-
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pacities are oriented towards that which really satisfies or fulfills 
them, and to nothing else. We are also able now to understand the 
meaning of Moore's question. Of anything that is actually desired we 
can ask: is this thing really good? That is to say, on the level of 
conscious desire, we can ask of anything consciously desired whether 
it is really good, i.e. whether it corresponds to and fulfills a needj 
capacity in uso However, on the level of natural needjcapacity, the 
question is meaningless. Of anything that satisfies or fulfills a natural 
needjcapacity, it is meaningless to ask whether it is really good. (But, 
it would be meaningful to ask, does it appear good to us?). 
And this brings us to the problem correlating these different 
modes of good with the different modes of desire. There are the fol-
lowing possibilities: (1) What is really needed is also consciously desi-
red. In which case the real good is also an apparent, good. (2) What is 
really needed is not consciously desired, and what is consciously 
desired is not really needed. In this case the real good. is not an 
apparent good, and the apparent good is not a real good. (3) What is 
consciously desired is contrary to, or prevents the fulfillment of a 
real need. In this case the apparent good is not only not a real good, 
but furthermore it is a real evil. (4) What is really needed is 
consciously refused. In this case the real good is not only not an 
apparent good, but it is an apparent evil. 
We are now in a position to see how and where the moral ought 
comes into the picture. If we were to correlate the real good only with 
the mode of desire called natural need, it at once becomes obvious 
that there is here no question of ought at all, but only of is. The real 
good is not what we onght to need, it is what we as a matter of fact 
actually need. Similarly, if we were to correlate the apparent good 
only with conscious desire, it is al so plain that there is no room 
for ought, but only for is. The apparent good is not what we ought 
consciously to desire, it is what as a matter of fact we do consciously 
desire. 
It is only when we cross-correlate the real good, or that which 
fulfills a built-in need, with conscious desire that is suddenly becomes 
inadequate and insufficient. It is then that ought suddenly springs into 
view and asserts itself with the force of self-evidence. We may or may 
not consciously desire that which fulfills a built-in need, but it is what 
we ought consciously to desire. In other words, the real good is what 
we ought consciously to desire. whether we do so or noto Similarly, 
what is contrary to real need-real evil-is what we ought not 
consciously to desire, whether we do so or noto 
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That the real good ought to be desired, and the real evil ought 
not to be desired, on the conscious level that is, is a self-evident 
axiom. Any man who asks {( Why is it that the real good ought to be 
consciously desired»? merely shows that he has not really understood, 
he has not really sunk his teeth into the meaning of real good. And 
the thrust and effect of this axiom is to heal the division within man 
himself, by integrating his needs and his desires. Thus is man made 
whole, made one, put at peace with himself. 
Thus, too, are two senses of desirable earlier mentioned: (1) can 
be desired, as evidenced by actual desire; and (2) worthy of desire, 
perfectly distinguished but not divorced. And thus is the insight of 
common sense rationally vindicated, when the man in the street as-
serts paradoxically that many desirable things are not desirable. E.g., 
heroin, is desirable in the first sense, and at the same time undesirable 
in the second sense. Desirable and apparently good, i.e. «deemed» 
good because it is as a matter of fact consciously sought foro And 
undesirable, or not worthy of desire, when referred to that deeper 
mode of desire which is natural need. 
The following four considerations will, I hope, throw further 
light on these fundamental distinctions between real good and ap-
parent good, between the mode of conscious desire and the mode of 
desire as natural need or capacity. (1) Needs can be either felt or not, 
Le. conscious or unconscious. In other words, our natural needs may 
or may not be accompanied by an awareness of the things that fulfill 
or satisfy those needs. (2) Natural needs can become objects of aware-
ness. And it is precisely when they become objects of awareness that 
they ought to be objects of conscious desires. (3) Our conscious 
desires have a broader scope than our natural needs. We not only 
can, but we actually desire many more things than we need. We can 
even desire things that are contrary to our needs. (4) Conscious desires 
are always spurred by our awareness of things, they are always the 
result of our experiences. On the other hand, whether or not we are 
conscious of our needs, these needs are never the result of our expe-
riences, they are inherent or built-in into our make-up or structure 
as human beings. 
It is true that sorne economists speak of needs created by the 
arts of propaganda and persuasion. But they qualify these needs as 
artificial, or stimulated, or induced in contrast to real or natural 
needs. They do not weaken but buttress the point being made here. 
Because the thrust of their language is quite plain. There are certain 
wants that are there from the beginning sinee they are part and pareel 
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of being human; there are other wants that come into existence onlyas 
a result of factors impinging on human awareness, wants formed in 
us in the light of our experiences. The former are needs in a straight-
forward sense. We can call them needs without qualification. The 
latter cannot be called needs unless we qualify the term, unless we 
enclose the term within quotation marks. 
It should be clear by now that the ought which has entered into 
the picture is of a quite different sort from the ought in statements 
such as «Castillo ought to be listed after Cariño», or «There ought 
to be a solar eclipse tomorrow», or «Fish ought to be in water». In 
these statements the oughts follow from the pattern of the alphabet, 
from the structure of the solar system, from the structure of fishes-
all matters of fact. But they are not moral oughts. The first is a con-
ventional ought; the second, a physical ought: the third, a biological 
ought. 
But when I say «The real good ought to be desired, or «This is a 
real good, therefore it ought to be desired», these oughts in the first 
place have to do with my free will , with what I will or will not 
consciously desire. In the second place, the statements tell me that, 
even if as a matter of fact I do not desire the real good, still I ought 
to desire it, In other words, they are normative oughts, oughts that 
prescribe the kind of behaviour expected of me. In the third place, 
the axiom «The real good ought to be desired» is not hypothetical, 
but categorical. The meaning of the axiom is not «You ought to desire 
it, if you need it». There are no «ifs» and «buts» about the need. It is 
not an artificial or induced need; it is a built-in, or natural, need. The 
need is there independently of whether we will it or noto It is a catego-
cal need. 
Plainly, therefore, we have here a genuine moral ought. And this 
moral ought stems from the fact that the thing which ought to be 
desired is, as a matter of fact, a real good, or fulfills as a matter of 
fact a need or capacity inherent in mano In other words, it seems 
plain to me that a statement of fact about whether something does in 
fact fulfill a natural need or capacity contains implicitly a normative 
statement as to what I ought or ought not consciously to desire and 
do. In other words, that a moral ought is implicit in a certain type 
of is-statement, and therefore can be drawn from it. 
